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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis, General Growth Properties, Inc. 
(“GGP”), the second-largest owner and operator of shopping centers in the country, 
was ostensibly a successful and profitable enterprise.1  In fact, GGP’s net operating 
income (“NOI”), the standard measurement of financial performance in the 
commercial real estate industry, totaled $2.59 billion in 2008, a four and one-half 
percent increase from 2007.2  As of December 31, 2008, GGP held $29.6 billion in 
assets, including more than 200 shopping centers in forty-four states.3  However, by 
April 2009, GGP had defaulted on eight mortgage loans in an aggregate amount of 
more than $670 million.4  On April 16, 2009, GGP filed a voluntary Chapter 11 
petition,5 commencing the “biggest real estate bankruptcy in U.S. history.”6 
 GGP’s dire financial straits may represent the next crisis in the U.S. 
economy—refinancing commercial real estate.7  Like many commercial real estate 
                                                 
* J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law. 
1 Steven Seidenberg, The Pain Spreads, A.B.A. J. MAG. (Jan. 2, 2010, 12:20 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_pain_speads/. 
2 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 55 n.23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
3 Id. at 47-48.  
4 Id. at 54 n.22.  
5 Id. at 54.  GGP is a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) and the parent company of 750 wholly-
owned subsidiaries and affiliates, 388 of which comprised the eventual debtors in the Chapter 11 
proceeding.  Id. at 47, 54.  
6 Seidenberg, supra note 1.  
7 See id. 
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ventures, GGP leveraged itself to finance its expansion.8  Prior to the credit market 
freeze, GGP financed its capital needs through conventional and mezzanine 
mortgage loans from banks and institutional lenders and increasingly through the 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) market.9  The mortgage loans 
were typical of the commercial setting insofar as the loans were secured by the 
underlying commercial properties and were structured over three to seven-year 
terms, with low amortization rates and balloon payments due at maturity.10  In its 
bankruptcy proceeding, GGP did not dispute that its business model relied upon its 
ability to refinance its debts at maturity.11  Furthermore, the President and Chief 
Operating Officer of GGP testified that “‘[t]his approach was standard in the 
industry, so for many years, it has been rare to see commercial real estate financed 
with longer-term mortgages that would fully amortize.’”12 
 This model worked well until the credit crisis invaded the commercial real 
estate market, reducing available credit and making it more difficult for GGP to 
refinance its maturing debt on commercially viable terms.13  Moreover, the legal 
structure of the real estate mortgage investment conduit (“REMIC”) stymied GGP’s 
efforts to negotiate modifications to the terms of the loans financed through the 
CMBS market.14  As a result of its inability to refinance, GGP applied more of its 
NOI towards payment of its debts, which in turn left it with insufficient cash to meet 
prior development and redevelopment commitments.15  As additional mortgage 
                                                 
8 Id.; Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 48 (stating that, as of December 31, 2008, GGP’s assets and 
liabilities totaled $29.6 billion and $27.3 billion, respectively).  
9 Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 48-53.  
10 Id. at 53.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. (alteration in original). 
13 Id.  
14 See id. at 53-54.  See also Seidenberg, supra note 1 (Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, REMICs 
benefit from pass-through tax status.  However, if a REMIC makes a significant modification to a 
loan that it owns, the entity risks losing this favorable tax treatment, and any gain realized from the 
modification may be subject to a 100% penalty tax.  As a result, special servicers, who must approve 
any loan modification, are reluctant to do so unless the loan is in default or in imminent risk of 
default.).  
15 Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 54.  
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loans matured, GGP’s liquidity problems worsened, and it defaulted on several of its 
loans.16  After one lender initiated foreclosure proceedings, GGP published the 
following press release: “The collapse of the credit markets has made it impossible 
for GGP to refinance our maturing debt outside of Chapter 11.”17 
 Over the next five years, nearly $1 trillion of U.S. commercial real estate 
mortgage loans are scheduled to mature,18 and, unless the credit market quickly 
recovers, many commercial real estate firms may encounter refinancing troubles 
similar to those of GGP.  To make matters worse, commercial real estate values have 
fallen twenty-five to thirty percent since 2007.19  Furthermore, due to more rigorous 
underwriting standards, lenders will demand additional equity from borrowers 
seeking to refinance, many of whom will be unable or unwilling to take on more debt 
for properties that are already underwater.20  Consequently, one report estimates that 
by 2020, “hundreds of billions of dollars, [and] perhaps more than a trillion dollars, 
of commercial mortgages . . . are unlikely to qualify for refinancing . . . .”21  The same 
report predicts that “the scale of [the commercial mortgage refinancing crisis] is 
virtually unprecedented in commercial real estate, and its impact is likely to dominate 
the industry for the better part [of] a decade.”22 
Recent reforms to the nation’s financial system purport to safeguard the U.S. 
economy from future financial crises.23  However, in the short-term, the new 
regulations may further reduce the availability of credit and increase the cost of 
borrowing, thereby exacerbating the refinancing crisis in the commercial real estate 
                                                 
16 Id.  
17 Seidenberg, supra note 1.  
18 RICHARD PARKUS & JING AN, DEUTSCHE BANK, THE FUTURE REFINANCING CRISIS IN 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.azcommercial.biz/Pdf/articles/Deutsche-Bank-The-Future-Refinancing-Crisis-in-
CRE.pdf. 
19 Id. at 3. 
20 See id. 
21 See id.  
22 Id.  
23 See, e.g., Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: Monitoring Systemic Risk and Promoting Financial Stability: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 42-44 (2011) (Prepared 
Statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).  
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market.24  The securitization of residential mortgage-backed assets is generally cited 
as the catalyst of the subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent collapse of the 
financial markets.25  In reaction to the devastated U.S. economy, Congress passed the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) to 
overhaul the regulatory framework of the financial services industry.26  With respect 
to mortgage-backed securities, Dodd-Frank requires issuers to retain five percent of 
the credit risk of any non-qualified assets27 and to provide loan or asset-level 
disclosures to investors.28  Although ultimate rulemaking authority is delegated 
among various federal agencies,29 Dodd-Frank itself fails to adequately differentiate 
between the residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) and CMBS markets.30  
Accordingly, the Federal Reserve has warned that “a single approach to credit risk 
retention could curtail credit availability in certain sectors of the securitization market 
. . . [and] is unlikely to be effective in achieving [greater investor protections] across a 
broad spectrum of asset categories where securitization practices differ markedly.”31 
Approximately $800 billion of commercial mortgage loans are currently 
financed through the CMBS market,32 comprising over fifteen percent of all 
                                                 
24 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
RISK RETENTION 84 (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/ 
securitization/riskretention.pdf; see also Robert A. Brown, Financial Reform and the Subsidization of 
Sophisticated Investors’ Ignorance in Securitization Markets, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 105, 121 (2010) 
(“[I]ncreased regulation of securitized products may have unintended negative consequences . . . .”).  
25 See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE passim (2011).  
26 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010). 
27 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i) (2010).  
28 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (2010).  
29 These federal agencies include the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“Treasury”), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(“Federal Reserve”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (“FHFA”), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). See, 
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(A) (2010).  
30 Brown, supra note 24, at 114.  
31 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 84.  
32 Brown, supra note 24, at 108. 
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commercial real estate financing in the U.S.33  By 2018, roughly $685 billion of 
commercial mortgage loans in the CMBS market are scheduled to mature.34  As a 
sudden and full recovery in the credit market is not expected,35 the pressing question 
is not whether there will be a refinancing crisis in the commercial real estate market 
but how to contain it.  This daunting task falls squarely on the federal agencies that 
are charged with promulgating the new regulations under Dodd-Frank.  To prevent 
another collapse in the recovering economy, these agencies must not impute the 
failures of RMBS to CMBS but must, instead, recognize the significant structural 
differences between the two products that account for greater investor protections in 
the CMBS market.36 
This article argues that the policy concerns behind the risk retention and 
mandatory disclosure requirements under Dodd-Frank do not exist in the CMBS 
market because the product structure of CMBS currently provides sufficient investor 
protections.  Part II describes mortgage-backed securities, including the origins of 
mortgage-backed securities and the features of the modern secondary mortgage 
market.  Part III summarizes the events that culminated in the subprime mortgage 
crisis and, ultimately, in the collapse of the financial markets.  Part IV presents a 
behavioral economics perspective on the subprime mortgage and financial crises that 
largely shaped Dodd-Frank.  Part V discusses the performance of the CMBS market 
both prior to and throughout the financial crisis.  Part VI explains why the policy 
justifications offered for risk retention and enhanced disclosure do not apply to the 
CMBS market. 
 
 
                                                 
33 Id. at 124.  
34 PARKUS & AN, supra note 18, at 5 (listing CMBS figures excluding commercial mortgage loans in 
collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”)).  
35 See Joseph Philip Forte, Risk Retention in CMBS Lending—Reality or Illusion, SS047 ALI-ABA 1255 
(2011) (“[R]eal estate investors remain skeptical, despite the . . . recovery of capital markets in recent 
months, whether commercial mortgage-backed securities can restart with sufficient volume to finance 
the recovery of the commercial property markets . . . .”).  
36 See Brown, supra note 24, at 116; see also Thomas E. Plank, Regulation and Reform of the Mortgage Market 
and the Nature of Mortgage Loans: Lessons from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 S.C. L. REV. 779, 780-81 
(2009) [hereinafter Plank, Regulation and Reform] (“It is a truism . . . that any regulatory regime should 
reflect the nature of the property and transactions being regulated.”).  
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II. MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
The securitization of mortgage-backed assets developed as a solution to a 
historic challenge in mortgage financing: balancing long-term assets with long-term 
liabilities.37  Indeed, “[s]ound financing of any viable enterprise requires that the 
enterprise match its assets and its liabilities, and the history of the mortgage finance 
market . . . has demonstrated the unhappy results for enterprises that attempt to 
finance long-term assets with short-term liabilities.”38  The problem inherent in the 
mortgage loan is the disconnect between the life of the mortgage debt and the life of 
the underlying property.39  The following scenarios illustrate this problem.  For the 
homeowner, the property that secures a mortgage debt is a long-term asset.40  A 
change in market conditions, such as a decline in property values, engenders the risk 
that the homeowner will be unable to refinance a short-term mortgage debt—the 
liability—without investing additional equity into the property.41  However, a longer-
term mortgage debt allows the homeowner to spread this risk over the life of the 
home ownership.42  On the other hand, for the owner of a long-term fixed-rate 
mortgage loan—the asset—an increase in short-term market interest rates results in a 
reduction in value of the mortgage loan.43 
A. The Origins of Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 Securitization is a product of the history of the mortgage finance market in 
the U.S. and, in particular, the two scenarios described above, each of which resulted 
in market dislocations during the twentieth century.44  Prior to the 1930s, the typical 
residential mortgage loan was structured over three- to six-year terms with low 
amortization, if any, and balloon payments due at maturity – the point at which 
                                                 
37 See Thomas E. Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market: The Nature of the Mortgage Loan and 
Regulatory Reform, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 135, 137 (2011) [hereinafter Plank, Crisis in the 
Mortgage Finance Market]. 
38 Plank, Regulation and Reform, supra note 36, at 781.  
39 See id.; see also Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market, supra note 37, at 137-38.  
40 Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market, supra note 37, at 137.  
41 See id. at 137-38; Plank, Regulation and Reform, supra note 36, at 781.  
42 See Plank, Regulation and Reform, supra note 36, at 781.  
43 See Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market, supra note 37, at 138.  
44 See id. at 137-39.  
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homeowners refinanced their debts.45  This market functioned until the Great 
Depression, when property values dropped, credit became scarce, and large numbers 
of homeowners, who could no longer roll over their debts, went into default.46  
Congress responded to the mortgage crisis of the 1930s with legislation that created 
federal savings and loan associations and standardized the use of long-term fixed-rate 
amortizing mortgage loans.47 
Long-term fixed-rate mortgage loans reduced the risk of declining property 
values for the homeowners in the first scenario described above.48  Unfortunately, 
the federal savings and loan associations and their private sector counterparts 
(“S&Ls”) failed to balance these long-term assets with long-term liabilities, which 
merely moved the risk up one level on the mortgage finance ladder and produced the 
second scenario described above.49  S&Ls financed these long-term fixed-rate 
mortgage loans through interest-bearing savings accounts that were vulnerable to 
short-term market fluctuation.  Now described as the “3-6-3” system,50 this model 
functioned while short-term market interest rates remained stable.51  However, 
inflation and spikes in market interest rates throughout the 1960s and 1970s eroded 
the value of long-term fixed-rate mortgage loans, and, by the early 1980s, many S&Ls 
were insolvent.52  Moreover, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 removed advantageous tax 
shelters for real estate investment vehicles, causing real estate prices to fall, further 
devaluing long-term fixed-rate mortgage loans.53  The effect of the Savings and 
Loans Crisis was the closing in the early 1990s of thousands of S&Ls, which had 
                                                 
45 Plank, Regulation and Reform, supra note 36, at 781.  
46 Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market, supra note 37, at 137-38.  
47 Id. at 138.  
48 See id.  
49 Id.  
50 The system earned its name from the expression that “[S&Ls] would borrow from depositors at 
3%, lend to mortgagors at 6%, and the [loan] officers were on the golf course by 3 pm.”  Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 See Brown, supra note 24, at 122-23.  
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been a major source of financing for both the residential and commercial real estate 
markets.54 
Recognizing the need to balance long-term assets with long-term liabilities, 
beginning in the 1970s, Congress authorized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
purchase residential mortgage loans from originators and issue securities backed by 
the mortgage loans and guaranteed by the federal government against default.55  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac then sold these securities to institutional investors such 
as banks and insurance companies that could spread the risk of market interest rate 
fluctuation across diverse portfolios.56  Following suit, the private sector created a 
market for RMBS loans that did not conform to the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
underwriting standards.57 
The CMBS market has a shorter but similar history.58  In 1989, in response to 
the Savings and Loans Crisis, Congress established the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(“RTC”) to securitize commercial real estate mortgage loans held by insolvent 
S&Ls.59  Between 1991 and 1995, the RTC issued $18 billion in CMBS.60  Discerning 
a high demand for commercial real estate financing following the collapse of the 
S&L industry, the private sector created the CMBS market.61 
B. The Secondary Mortgage Market 
 Although the secondary mortgage market is complex, the primary function 
of mortgage-backed securities is fairly straightforward.62  A mortgage represents the 
right to repayment of a loan.  The loan itself is, therefore, an asset.  Originators of 
                                                 
54 Id. at 123. 
55 Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market, supra note 37, at 139.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 See Brown, supra note 24, at 124-25.  
59 Georgette Chapman Phillips, The Paradox of Commercial Real Estate Debt, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 335, 
339 (2009).  
60 Id.  
61 See id.  
62 See Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 
1656 (2004) [hereinafter Plank, The Security of Securitization].  
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mortgage loans are in the business of lending to consumers, and, in order to do so, 
they must raise capital.63  Securitization provides originators of mortgage loans a 
cost-effective means of raising capital by converting relatively illiquid mortgage loans 
into highly liquid assets that can be sold to investors in the secondary mortgage 
market, ultimately resulting in a lower overall cost of credit to end consumers.64  The 
securities, which are backed solely by the mortgage loans themselves, represent the 
investors’ rights to repayment from the income stream of principal and interest on 
the underlying mortgage debt.65 
 Investors in the secondary mortgage market also enjoy a distinct benefit from 
investments in mortgage-backed securities in terms of lower transactional risk.66  To 
illustrate, in U.C.C. Article 9 transactions, secured lenders invariably assume two 
risks: first, the value of the collateral used to secure a debt will be insufficient to 
repay the full amount of the debt; and, second, for reasons unrelated to the collateral, 
that the debtor will become insolvent and seek relief in bankruptcy.67  However, a 
properly structured sale of mortgage-backed securities transfers the right to 
repayment away from the originator and thereby makes the second risk—that of 
bankruptcy—irrelevant.68  Stated differently, the investor’s return is unrelated to the 
creditworthiness of the originator.69  Thus, the risk to investors in the secondary 
mortgage market is limited to the underperformance of the underlying mortgage 
loans.70  This reduction in risk to investors lowers overall financing costs for 
originators, further reducing the cost of credit to end consumers.71 
 Removing the credit risk of the originator qualifies the mortgage-backed 
securities to receive a credit rating from a rating agency such as Moody’s or Standard 
                                                 
63 Id. at 1660.  
64 Id. at 1656-57.  
65 See id. at 1661.  
66 See id. at 1662.  
67 Id. at 1661-62.  
68 See id. at 1662. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
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and Poor’s (“S&P”).72  To obtain a credit rating, the issuer73 of mortgage-backed 
securities pays a fee and provides information about the underlying mortgage loans 
to a rating agency, which assesses the risk of the securities to be issued.74  The 
particular credit rating assigned corresponds to the likelihood of timely payment on 
the securities.75  To use S&P’s rating scale as an example, the highest investment-
grade credit rating available is AAA, with ratings descending to AA, then to A, and 
then to BBB, and BBB-.76  “Ratings below BBB- are deemed non-investment grade, 
and indicate that full and timely repayment on the securities may be speculative.”77  
By comparison, a rating of AAA indicates an “[e]xtremely strong capacity to meet 
financial commitments.”78 
 After origination but prior to issuance, the mortgage loans are pooled 
together and the payments on the loans are divided into senior and subordinate 
tranches, creating a diversity of risk across the lot.79  The subordinate tranches have 
higher interest rates but absorb any losses before the senior tranches are impaired.80  
Accordingly, rating agencies typically assign AAA ratings to the senior tranche 
securities.81  Furthermore, issuers may create multiple classes of securities within a 
                                                 
72 Id. at 1667.  
73 See id. at 1662-64 (describing the primary issuers of mortgage-backed securities).  Mortgage-backed 
securities are issued in two forms: pass-through certificates and debt securities.  In the case of pass-
through certificates, the issuer is an affiliate of the originator of the mortgage loans.  In the case of 
debt securities, the issuer is a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity (“SPE”).  Both are structured 
to remove the credit risk of the originator and the parent company of the SPE, respectively.  Id.  
74 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 7, 12 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets].  
75 Id. at 6. 
76 Id. at 7-8; see also Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVICES,  
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
77 Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets, supra note 74, at 7 (quoting Steven L. Schwarcz, The 
Universal Language of Crossborder Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 253 (1998)).  
78 Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs, supra note 76.  
79 Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market, supra note 37, at 139.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
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single tranche to appeal to different investor appetites for market-value risk.82  In this 
scenario, the senior-most class would receive all income from the mortgage pool 
until repaid in full, at which point additional income would cascade down to each 
lower class in order of seniority.83  Thus, issuers can structure the payments on the 
mortgage loans to devise securities with short, medium, and long-term market-value 
risks,84 which a rating agency might distinguish with credit ratings such as AA+, AA, 
and AA-, respectively.85  Not surprisingly, lower-rated securities are typically 
purchased by investors with investment strategies for both higher risk and higher 
yield.86 
 After issuance, the securities themselves may then be repackaged and issued a 
second time through a collateral debt obligation (“CDO”), adding a layer of 
complexity to the secondary mortgage market.87  The basic logic of a CDO is the 
same as that of the original lot of securities—to diversify risk.  However, in the case 
of a CDO, the risk that is spread derives from the subordinate securities, not from 
the underlying mortgage loans.88  In a typical CDO, the income on a pool of 
subordinate securities is divided into senior and subordinate CDO tranches, 
diversifying risk, however artificially, across the lot of repackaged subordinate 
securities.89  Similar to the original senior tranche securities, the senior CDO tranche 
securities are repaid before those in subordinate CDO tranches, which have higher 
interest rates but bear greater risk.90  Accordingly, in the case of a CDO with a senior 
tranche and two subordinate tranches, a rating agency might assign a credit rating of 
                                                 
82 Id.  
83 See id.  
84 Id.  
85 Credit Ratings Definitions & FAQs, supra note 76 (“Ratings from ‘AA’ to ‘CCC’ may be modified by 
the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing within the major rating 
categories.”).  
86 Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market, supra note 37, at 139.  
87 See LEWIS, supra note 25, at 72-73; see also John C. Kelly, An Introduction to Commercial Real Estate 
CDOs (Part I), 21 PROB. & PROP. 38, 38 (2007) (A CDO is technically “a form of debt security, [but] 
the term is now commonly used to describe a particular type of capital markets transaction.”).  
88 See LEWIS, supra note 25, at 72-73.  
89 See id. at 73.  
90 See id. at 161 n.*.  
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AA, BBB+, and BBB-, respectively, despite the fact that many of the repackaged 
securities were initially rated BBB-.91  Sophisticated investors, cognizant of the 
greater risk inherent in CDO securities, developed the credit-default swap (“CDS”) 
to hedge their investments, adding yet another layer of complexity to the secondary 
mortgage market.92  For the purposes of this article, CDS may simply be understood 
as insurance against the risk of default of payments on the CDO securities.93 
III. THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS AND COLLAPSE OF THE FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
 The events that culminated in the subprime mortgage crisis and, ultimately, 
in the collapse of the financial markets occurred over the course of more than a 
decade.94  During the late 1990s and most of the 2000s, low interest rates and readily 
available credit contributed to the formation of a housing bubble in the U.S. 
economy characterized by inflated home prices.95  Market optimism in the 
appreciation of home values led originators to finance higher-risk, adjustable-rate 
mortgages that were frequently beyond the wherewithal of borrowers, who often did 
not adequately understand the repayment terms to make prudent budgetary 
decisions.96  As these higher-risk, subprime mortgages were packaged into RMBS, 
the models used by rating agencies to assign credit ratings did not evaluate the 
underlying mortgages individually but, instead, interpreted general characteristics 
across entire pools of mortgages.97  Consequently, vast numbers of RMBS issued 
from pools comprised substantially of subprime mortgages were overrated as safe 
                                                 
91 See id. (“In practice . . . a CDO might have fifteen different tranches, each with a slightly different 
rating, from triple-B-minus all the way up to triple-A.”).  
92 See, e.g., id. at 74-75.  
93 In fact, CDS are more complex. For a thorough discussion of CDS, see LEWIS, supra note 25, passim.  
94 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 419-24 (2011), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
95 See id.  
96 See id. at 425-26.  
97 See LEWIS, supra note 25, at 99-100 (For example, one model was based on FICO scores, which 
measure the creditworthiness of individual borrowers.  Rather than evaluating the FICO score of each 
homeowner, Moody’s and S&P interpreted the average FICO scores across pools of mortgages, 
which were susceptible to manipulation by packaging a correspondingly high FICO score to offset 
each low FICO score.).  
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investments and disseminated throughout the financial markets.98  Relying on the 
credit ratings, financial institutions that invested in the secondary mortgage market 
failed to conduct their own independent due diligence on the underlying mortgages 
and became significantly exposed to subprime risk.99 
 The U.S. housing bubble burst in 2006, and home prices declined in housing 
markets across the country.100  In 2007, the low teaser rates for the 2005 vintage of 
adjustable-rate subprime mortgages reset at higher market interest rates.101  
Borrowers who could not afford the higher mortgage payments and could not 
refinance their debts through home appreciation defaulted in historic numbers.102  
Others who could afford the higher mortgage payments abandoned homes that were 
underwater.103  Defaults on the subprime mortgages in turn caused the lowest-
tranche RMBS to default and the higher-tranche triple-A rated RMBS to be 
downgraded.104  As a result, the market value of all RMBS plummeted.105  By the end 
of the subprime mortgage crisis, financial institutions heavily leveraged with 
concentrations of highly correlated housing risk had suffered hundreds of billions of 
dollars of losses in subprime mortgages and RMBS.106  In 2008, the failure, near 
failure, or corporate restructuring of several of the major firms in quick succession 
precipitated shock and panic throughout the financial system as the health of every 
large and midsize financial institution came into question.107  In the aftermath, the 
                                                 
98 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 94, at 426.  
99 Id.  
100 LEWIS, supra note 25, at 95, 126; Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 
S.C. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2009) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis].  
101 See LEWIS, supra note 25, at 180, 197-98.  
102 Id. at 180; Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 100, at 551-52.  
103 Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 100, at 552.  
104 See id.  
105 See id.  
106 Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 373, 379 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets]; see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMM’N, supra note 94, at 428-29 (stating that “every $35 of assets was financed with $1 of equity 
capital and $34 of debt . . . [and a] 3 percent decline in the market value . . . would leave them 
technically insolvent”).  
107 Id. at 435-36.  
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financial markets collapsed, the credit market severely contracted, and the economy 
plunged into a deep recession.108 
IV. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
 According to behavioral economists, three fundamental failures in the 
securitization of residential mortgage-backed assets caused the subprime mortgage 
crisis and the subsequent collapse of the financial markets.109  First, behavioral 
economists suggest that securitization facilitated a failure in residential mortgage 
lending standards.110  The originate-to-distribute model of mortgage lending, which 
refers to the practice of selling off mortgages as the loans are closed, enabled 
mortgage originators to remove the credit risk of the loans from their balance sheets 
and transfer that risk to the investors that purchased RMBS in the secondary 
mortgage market.111  This model allegedly engendered moral hazard112 and fraud to 
the extent that the interests of originators, with respect to the risk on the mortgages, 
were not aligned with the interests of investors, resulting in lax mortgage lending 
standards.113 
Second, behavioral economists claim that securitization produced 
investments that were too complex for investors to comprehend.114  Prior to any 
offering of RMBS, issuers provide investors a prospectus disclosing detailed 
information on the loans that comprise the pools from which the securities are to be 
issued.115  Behavioral economists acknowledge that, except for the extent to which 
                                                 
108 Id. at 437-38.  
109 Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 100, at 561.  
110 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 218 (2009) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets].  
111 See id.  
112 Moral hazard refers to the greater tendency of actors that are protected from the consequences of 
risky behavior to engage in that behavior.  See id. at 218 n.34. 
113 Id. at 218. 
114 Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 100, at 563-64.  
115 See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 110, at 222; see also LEWIS, supra 
note 25, at 27 (indicating that prospectuses disclosed the interest rates on adjustable-rate mortgages 
and the borrowers FICO scores).  
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home prices declined, “virtually all of the risks giving rise to the collapse of the 
market for securities backed by subprime mortgages appear to have been 
disclosed.”116  However, many investors reportedly failed to appreciate these risks 
because the complexity of RMBS made the risks very difficult to understand.117  
Alternatively, the complexity of RMBS increased the amount of information that had 
to be analyzed, and certain investors determined that the costs to analyze this 
information outweighed the benefits of performing the analysis.118  
Third, behavioral economists argue that the inability of investors to 
comprehend the complexity of the securities caused them to be overly reliant on 
credit ratings.119  Because the risks of RMBS were difficult to understand and the 
costs of conducting an independent due diligence analysis were high, investors 
resorted to credit ratings to simplify and economize their investment decisions 
instead of attempting to fully grasp the complexity of the securities.120  Consequently, 
overreliance on the credit ratings exposed investors to the subprime risk that the 
flawed models of the rating agencies failed to detect and that independent due 
diligence would have identified.121 
In light of these failures in the RMBS market, legal commentators called for 
reforms to the secondary mortgage market.122  Specifically, behavioral economists 
advocated for increased mandatory disclosure on mortgage-backed securities and 
                                                 
116 Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 110, at 222.  
117 Id.; see also Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 106, at 382 (mentioning the theory that 
investors’ actions were the result of “bounded rationality imposed by human cognitive limitations”).  
118 Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 110, at 221 (stating that, under the 
rational ignorance theory, “there is a point at which the benefit obtained from additional analysis can 
be outweighed, or at least appear to be outweighed, by the costs of performing that analysis”).  
119 Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 100, at 563.  
120 Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 110, at 222; see also Christine Jolls et 
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (To compensate for 
limited cognitive ability, humans employ simplifying heuristics to economize thinking time and 
minimize decision costs.).  
121 See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 110, at 223 (“Although the use of 
heuristics might be efficient overall in certain applications, heuristic reasoning can sometimes expose 
analysis to bias and systematic error.”).  
122 Brown, supra note 24, at 112-13; Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 100, 
at 564.  
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reallocation of risk from investors to issuers by requiring issuers to retain a risk of 
loss.123  Acting on calls for reform to the financial services industry, Congress 
enacted these proposals in the Dodd-Frank legislation.124  Regarding mortgage-
backed securities, Dodd-Frank requires issuers to provide loan or asset-level 
disclosures to investors125 and retain the first five percent of credit risk of any non-
qualified assets.126 
V. PERFORMANCE OF THE CMBS MARKET BEFORE AND DURING THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 In contrast to the mortgage loans underlying RMBS, commercial mortgage 
loans did not materially change with respect to repayment terms or underwriting 
standards prior to the financial crisis.127  In fact, until recently, defaults on 
commercial mortgages did not significantly deviate from the default levels observed 
in the commercial real estate market over the forty-year period preceding the 
financial crisis.128  Moreover, the recent rise in default rates on commercial mortgages 
is attributable to the decline in commercial property values and the growing 
phenomenon in the current credit market of “maturity defaults,” which refers to the 
inability of commercial real estate borrowers to refinance the outstanding balances 
on their maturing debt.129  As a result, from 2007 to 2009, the performance of CMBS 
was relatively strong compared to RMBS and other asset-backed securities.130 
 CMBS offerings have slowed dramatically since the financial crisis.131  
Nevertheless, the relatively strong performance of the CMBS market from 2007 to 
                                                 
123 Brown, supra note 24, at 113; Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 100, at 
562.  
124 Brown, supra note 24, at 114.  
125 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (2010).  
126 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B) (2010).  
127 Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation, and the Crisis of 2007-2009 
42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16206, 2010). 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 2; see also PARKUS & AN, supra note 18, at 3.  
130 See Stanton & Wallace, supra note 127, at 2-3.  
131 See Brown, supra note 24, at 108-11.  
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2009 presents an unresolved counterpoint to the policy justifications offered by 
behavioral economists for enhanced disclosure and risk retention by issuers of asset-
backed securities.132  The elephant in the room that behavioral economists have yet 
to address is why issuers would have more information about investment quality and 
risk than investors themselves.133  In the CMBS market, for example, issuers have 
traditionally performed the role of broker, finding and matching investors with 
commercial mortgage originators in real estate markets throughout the country.134  
On the other hand, investors in the CMBS market are large, sophisticated 
institutional investors that are often also originators of commercial mortgages and, 
therefore, are familiar with conditions across commercial real estate markets.135  
Accordingly, investors are better equipped to evaluate the investment quality and risk 
of CMBS than issuers.136 
VI. THE CMBS MARKET OFFERS GREATER INVESTOR PROTECTIONS THAN 
THE RMBS MARKET 
 The CMBS market has been a crucial source of commercial real estate 
financing in recent years, supplying credit for approximately one-half of all 
commercial real estate acquisitions in the U.S.137  Given the austerity of the current 
credit market, revived CMBS lending would offset the shortfall in credit necessary to 
refinance the billions of dollars of commercial real estate debt maturing over the next 
several years.138  Unfortunately, the risk retention and mandatory disclosure 
                                                 
132 See id. at 116.  
133 Id. at 117.  
134 Id.  Many of the largest commercial mortgage originators are affiliates of CMBS issuers; however, 
“the skillset required to evaluate the market for a CMBS loan is different than that of knowing the 
market of a CMBS security.” Id. at 117 n.58.  
135 Id. at 117.  
136 The reallocation of risk from sophisticated investors to issuers of securities overlooks the 
possibility that investors have more experience in the underlying asset class than issuers who are mere 
brokers. See id. at 154.  
137 Id. at 108; Ken Miller, Using Letters of Credit, Credit Default Swaps and Other Forms of Credit 
Enhancements in Net Lease Transactions, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 45, 46 (2009).  
138 See In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the CMBS 
market was “dead” and that “there is no evident means of refinancing billions of dollars of 
[commercial] real estate debt coming due in the next several years”).  
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requirements under Dodd-Frank would result in unintended consequences that 
could reduce already scarcely available credit.139  By mechanically forcing issuers to 
absorb the first losses on CMBS, the risk retention requirements would drive up the 
price of CMBS, as issuers pass on the additional costs of risk to investors.140  
Likewise, issuers would demand recompense from investors for the additional due 
diligence costs incurred in providing enhanced disclosure on the underlying 
mortgage loans.141  As prices rise, investors would purchase fewer CMBS, mortgage 
originators would have less capital to extend new loans, and the cost of credit would 
increase for end consumers.142  However, the new regulations under Dodd-Frank are 
unnecessary because securitization in the CMBS market currently offers sufficient 
investor protections.143 
A. CMBS Lending Practices Prevent Fraud and Weak Underwriting Standards 
Commercial mortgage loans contain terms that seldom appear in residential 
mortgage loans and that have largely prevented fraud and weak underwriting 
standards as observed in the RMBS market.144  For instance, in contrast to the 
standard residential mortgage loan, commercial mortgage loans typically include 
prepayment penalties that deter borrowers from accelerating their loans prior to 
maturity.145  As a result, commercial borrowers and lenders alike tend to finance only 
those properties that will generate sufficient NOI to meet the debt service over the 
life of the loans and are, therefore, more default remote.146  Furthermore, due to the 
size of the loans,147 commercial mortgage originators conduct more extensive due 
diligence on the underlying properties and contract for additional protections from 
                                                 
139 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 84.  
140 Brown, supra note 24, at 173.  
141 Id.  
142 See id.  
143 Id. at 126.  
144 Id. at 126-27. 
145 Id. at 127.  
146 Id. at 127-28.  
147 Id. at 137 (“[T]he average size of a loan in a CMBS transaction is close to $6 million[, and] several 
loans larger than $30 million [are] contributed to most securitizations.”).  
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borrowers in the form of representations and warranties.148  Originators, in turn, 
extend these protections to investors and may be bound to repurchase CMBS loans 
in the event that a representation or warranty is violated.149  In addition to 
prophylactic loan terms, commercial mortgage lending generally involves repeat 
players that have a prior history or stand to benefit from future business 
relationships.150  Consequently, unlike residential lending, reputational mechanisms 
exist in commercial real estate transactions that prevent fraud at the initial origination 
of CMBS.151 
B. CMBS Transactions Involve Fewer Loans and Sophisticated Investors 
Compared to RMBS transactions, CMBS transactions involve fewer loans, 
which allows B-piece investors to conduct more careful and thorough due diligence 
on the pools of loans on a loan-level basis.152  For example, in an average CMBS 
transaction, there are only 300 loans per loan pool.153  As a result, prior to any CMBS 
offering, the B-piece investor can review the loan documents for each loan and have 
its agents inspect each underlying property.154  Furthermore, the B-piece investor in 
CMBS may even remove a negotiated number of CMBS loans from the loan pool 
that are deemed substandard.155  On the other hand, because senior tranche CMBS 
are repaid before any subordinate tranche CMBS, senior investors need only evaluate 
the ability of the B-piece investor to accurately assess the risk of the lower tranche 
CMBS.156  Where the risk assessment of the B-piece investor is correct, senior 
investors will not experience any losses on senior tranche CMBS.157  Moreover, 
unlike the RMBS market, CMBS investors are exclusively large, sophisticated firms 
                                                 
148 Id. at 136-37, 156.  
149 Id. at 156 (Rather than risk retention, “one method to improve investor protection [would] simply 
be to enforce the existing agreements . . . that the parties have entered into.”).  
150 Id. at 134.  
151 Id.  
152 See id. at 133.  
153 Id. at 140.  
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155 Id. at 153; Forte, supra note 35, at 1259-60.  
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that are familiar with both the product structure of CMBS and conditions in the 
commercial real estate market.158  In particular, “the [B-piece investor in CMBS] is 
usually a real estate specialist with extensive knowledge about the underlying 
[properties] and mortgages in the pools.”159  Thus, CMBS are not inherently so 
complex that sophisticated investors cannot accurately determine investment quality 
and price the risk accordingly.160 
C. CMBS Losses Correlate with Rating Agencies’ Reduction to Subordination Levels 
A recent study finds that, prior to the financial crisis, the only significant 
change in the CMBS market was a reduction in the subordination levels161 of CMBS 
by rating agencies.162  Otherwise, CMBS loans did not materially change, and defaults 
did not significantly deviate from historic levels.163  Furthermore, unlike the RMBS 
market, where losses were suffered across all tranches of RMBS, the CMBS market 
has not observed significant devaluation of the highest tranche CMBS.164  
Consequently, the losses experienced on lower tranche CMBS—resulting from 
defaults on CMBS loans substantially in line with historic levels—correlate with the 
reduction in subordination levels by rating agencies and “would have been 
completely avoided had subordination levels remained at their [previous] levels.”165  
Moreover, the study does not indicate that the losses on lower tranche CMBS were 
the result of the complexity of CMBS as investments or that sophisticated investors 
misunderstood the risks involved.166  However, even assuming that the complexity of 
CMBS caused investors to be overly reliant on rating agencies, the mere fact that 
investors in the CMBS market are large, sophisticated firms implies that fewer 
                                                 
158 See id. at 117, 149-50; Stanton & Wallace, supra note 127, at 2.  
159 Stanton & Wallace, supra note 127, at 2 n.5.  
160 Brown, supra note 24, at 155-56.  
161 The subordination level of a mortgage-backed asset is “the maximum amount of principal loss on 
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Wallace, supra note 127, at 3 n.7.  
162 Id. at 42.  
163 Id. at 43. 
164 See Brown, supra note 24, at 116.  
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2012] THE REFINANCING CRISIS IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 381 
 
 
 
protections are necessary.167  Thus, the policy justifications for the risk retention and 
mandatory disclosure requirements do not apply to the CMBS market because the 
product structure of CMBS currently provides sophisticated investors with sufficient 
protections.168 
VII. CONCLUSION 
  The next crisis in the U.S. economy may be a refinancing crisis in the 
commercial real estate market.  Securitization in the CMBS market has been an 
increasingly significant source of commercial real estate financing, and revived 
CMBS lending would mitigate the shortfall in available credit in the coming years.  
Unfortunately, the risk retention and enhanced disclosure requirements under Dodd-
Frank would hinder recovery in the CMBS market without meaningfully improving 
investor protections.  Moreover, these regulations are unnecessary because the 
greater CMBS market has not experienced the failures that occurred in                           
other markets, and the product structure of CMBS currently provides sufficient in-                               
vestor protections.  In conclusion, to avoid the unintended, negative consequences                
of Dodd-Frank, which would further curtail already scarcely available credit, the first               
loss position should remain with the B-piece investors in CMBS who are far better 
suited than issuers to evaluate investment quality and risk of CMBS. 
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